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S.C.C. No. 
25823 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
(On Appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal ) 
B E T W E E N : 
MAVIS BAKER 
Appellant 
and 
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
Respondent 
FACTUM OF THE  
CHARTER COMMITTEE ON POVERTY ISSUES 
PART I - FACTS 
1. This appeal is about the validity of the decision of the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration (the "Minister") to deny Mavis Baker's application for permanent residence 
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and, in all likelihood, separate her from her 
children. 
2. The only reasons the Minister has provided for refusing Ms. Baker's application are the 
notes of the recommending officer Lorenz, which state, inter alia: 
1. PC is unemployed -- on Welfare. No income shown -- no assets. Has four 
Cdn.-born children - four other children in Jamaica - HAS A TOTAL OF 
EIGHT CHILDREN. ... 
This case is a catastrophy. It is also an indictment of our "system" that the 
client came as a visitor in Aug. '81, was not ordered deported until Dec. 92 
and in Apr. '94 IS STILL HERE! 
2. The PC is a paranoid schizophrenic and on Welfare. She has no 
qualifications other than as a domestic. She has FOUR CHILDREN IN 
JAMAICA AND ANOTHER FOUR BORN HERE. She will of course be 
a tremendous strain on our social welfare systems for (probably) the rest 
of her life. There are no H&C factors other than her Four CANADIAN-
BORN CHILDREN. Do we let her stay because of that? I am of the 
opinion that Canada can no longer afford this type of generosity. However 
because of the circumstances involved, there is a potential for adverse 
publicity. I recommend refusal but you may wish to clear this with 
someone at Region. 
There is also a potential for violence -- see charge of "assault with a 
weapon". 
3. (Emphasis in the original) 
Notes of Officer Lorenz, Respondent's Record, Tab 2C, p. 28 
PART II - ISSUES 
3. CCPI's submissions focus on the appellant's third issue -- whether the Federal Court of 
Appeal erred in holding that a human rights treaty such as the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (the "CRC") has no legal effect over the exercise of discretion under s.114(2) 
of the Immigration Act. 
PART III - LAW AND ARGUMENT  
4. International human rights treaty law enters into Canadian law by virtue of interpretive 
reception by institutions, primarily courts, charged with construing the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and statutes, and thereby governs the exercise of discretion under s.114(2) 
of the Act. This body of law does not have direct force of law in Canada but has a 
significant normative force. 
5. International human rights treaties to which Canada is a party structure administrative 
decision-making by two main routes: 
a. the Charter route -- the use of the Charter to interpret the statutory limits of 
administrative discretion in association with the presumption that international 
human rights law gives content to Charter rights; and 
b. the treaty route -- the use of international human rights treaties in statutory 
interpretation, based on the presumption of legislative compliance with 
international law. 
6. In this case, CCPI submits that the Minister acted outside the jurisdiction granted her by 
s. 114(2) of the Immigration Act:  
 . by failing to exercise her discretion so as to avoid violating ss. 7 and 15 of the 
Charter, as informed by Canada's obligations under the CRC and related 
international human rights treaty obligations; and 
a. by failing, in any event, to exercise that discretion in accordance with the relevant 
international human rights treaties, regardless of whether the Charter is violated. 
A. THE CHARTER ROUTE 
7. In the present case no legislative provision has been challenged under the Charter and 
thus no constitutional questions have been set. However, the Charter is not only a vehicle 
for challenging legislative provisions inconsistent with Charter rights. Equally important, 
it is an affirmation of the fundamental values of Canadian democracy which must inform 
all aspects of the judiciary's interpretive role. This Court most recently demonstrated in 
Eldridge that the underlying values and principles of the Charter can be effectively 
promoted by Charter-consistent interpretation. 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 
The Slaight Double Presumption 
8. In Slaight Communications, the Supreme Court established the following two interpretive 
doctrines: 
 . "'...the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as 
great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights 
documents which Canada has ratified'" (the "international human rights 
presumption"); and 
a. statutes must be interpreted as far as possible so as not to empower administrative 
actors to violate Charter rights (the "Charter compliance presumption"). 
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056-1057, 1078-
1081 per Dickson C.J. on (a) and Lamer J. on (b) 
9. These two principles create an intrepretive presumption that administrative discretion be 
exercised in accordance with international human rights law. In this case, this double 
presumption requires that the Minister's discretion pursuant to s. 114(2) of the Act must 
be exercised, to the extent the statutory language permits, in compliance with ss. 7 and 15 
of the Charter, which provide at least as much protection as the rights contained in the 
CRC and other relevant treaties. 
The Need to Reaffirm the Slaight International Human Rights Presumption 
10. The Slaight presumption of Charter compliance has become a central doctrine of 
administrative law review. In general, however, lower courts have placed far less reliance 
on the Slaight international human rights presumption. There remains, in the words of 
Judge Rosalyn Higgins of the International Court of Justice, a "cultural resistance to 
international law" on the part of many lower courts. CCPI submits that the present case 
represents a prime opportunity for this Court to convey to the Canadian judiciary as a 
whole the centrality of international human rights to the over-riding values and 
interpretive framework of the Canadian legal order. 
Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994 at 206-207 
11. Such a judgment could draw upon two themes that can be distilled from judgments and 
speeches of members of this Court: 
 . the Charter shares the same fundamental values and commitment to legal 
protection as international human rights treaties, to such an extent that the Charter 
can be understood as the domestic analogue of those treaties; and 
a. domestic courts have an obligation to enter into a dialogue with international 
human rights bodies by contributing to and taking seriously international human 
rights jurisprudence. 
12. With respect to the theme of shared values, Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Keegstra held 
that: 
1. Generally speaking, the international human rights obligations taken on by 
Canada reflect the values and principles of a free and democratic society, 
and thus those values and principles that underlie the Charter itself. 
Chief Justice Lamer, in a recent keynote conference speech, similarly affirmed that "the 
Charter should be, and has been, understood as part of the international human rights 
movement."  
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 750 
Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, "Enforcing International Human Rights law: The Treaty System 
in the 21st Century", address at York University, June 22, 1997 at 6 
13. With respect to the dialogue between Canadian courts and international bodies, Chief 
Justice Lamer emphasized in the same speech: 
1. For international human rights law to be effective, ...it must be supported 
by what I would term a "human rights culture", by which I mean a culture 
in which there is a firm and deep-seated commitment to the importance of 
human rights in our world... I turn now to the second aspect of what I have 
termed the "institutional moment" of international human rights law, the 
growth of institutional dialogue between international human rights bodies 
and national courts. Like any true dialogue, this dialogue depends on the 
willing participation of both parties. ...[B]y looking to international 
treaties and the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies in the 
interpretation of domestic human rights norms[,] ...judges raise the profile 
of those international treaties and further the creation of a human rights 
culture. 
Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, International Human Rights Address, supra at 3, 4 and 7 
14. In another keynote conference speech, Justice La Forest spoke in similar terms about the 
cultivation of a certain cosmopolitan institutional orientation, or ethos, for the Canadian 
judiciary: 
1. What is happening is that we are absorbing international legal norms 
affecting the individual through our constitutional pores...Thus our courts - 
and many other national courts - are truly becoming international courts in 
many areas involving the rule of law. They will become more so and they 
continue to rely on and benefit from one another's experience. 
Consequently, it is important that...national judges adopt an international 
perspective. 
Hon. Gérard La Forest, "The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
International Law Issues" (1996) 34 C.Y.I.L. 89 at 98, 100-101 
Randall, Federal Courts and the International Human Rights Paradigm, Durham, Duke 
U.P., 1990 at 206, 280 
15. In the same speech, Mr. Justice La Forest commented that the Charter is viewed by this 
Court as "the instrument of choice in fostering compliance with international human 
rights law". Very recent cases indicate that lower court judges may be increasingly 
receptive to this point. 
Hon. Gérard La Forest, ibid. at 91  
Suresh v. R. (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 267 
Francis v. Canada [1998] O.J. No. 1791 
Provision of Effective Domestic Remedies Through Expansive Interpretation 
16. The growing emphasis by members of this Court on taking international human rights 
seriously through the Charter is mirrored by the emphasis of UN treaty bodies on the duty 
to provide effective judicial remedies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has specifically linked effective remedies under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the "ICESCR") with an expansive interpretation 
of the Charter: 
1. The Committee encourages the Canadian courts to continue to adopt a 
broad and purposive approach to the interpretation of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms so as to provide appropriate remedies against violations of 
social and economic rights in Canada. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on 
Canada, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/5 (1993) 
See also CRC General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports, 
1996 
17. Even where complaint mechanisms exist at the international level, international human 
rights bodies can only be expected to play a "secondary or supportive role" to domestic 
institutions in the effective protection of human rights. Thus, the Human Rights 
Committee, in charge of monitoring compliance with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), emphasizes the integral role of "mechanisms at the 
domestic level 1/4[that] 1/4 allow the Covenant rights to be enforceable at the local 
level."  
Alston, "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 HRQ 332 at 357 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24(52), General comment on issues 
relating to reservations..., U.N. Doc. CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) 
  
18. The corresponding emphasis of both the domestic and international legal orders on the 
importance of domestic courts in the protection of international human rights requires a 
purposive and expansive interpretive approach to the role of the Charter in this common 
enterprise. Courts must be extremely reluctant to interpret any Charter right narrowly so 
as to deny protection to an international human right. The presumption of compliance 
with international human rights law must be translated into a strong presumption of 
protection. Chief Justice Lamer has made this link in his recent speech: 
1. ...Canada is a signatory to many international human rights treaties and, as 
a result, the Charter can be viewed in an important sense as the domestic 
analogue of those instruments. In other words, the Charter can be 
understood to give effect to Canada's international legal obligations, and 
should therefore be interpreted in a way that conforms to those 
obligations. 
Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, International Human Rights Address, supra at 6 
Special Role of Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter as Links with International Human 
Rights  
19. As there is a strong presumption that international human rights are protected in the rights 
set out in the Charter, those rights not specifically provided for in the Charter must be 
located in general provisions. Sections 7 and 15 are particularly apt for the reception of 
international human rights. 
20. This Court in Oakes and subsequent cases has stated that the values underpinning a free 
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights in the Charter. Two of the most 
important values underpinning a free and democratic society, as cited in Oakes, are 
"respect for the inherent dignity of the human person 1/4[and]1/4commitment to social 
justice and equality." The lead article in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the 
"Universal Declaration") states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights1/4." Section 7 is the primary vehicle in the Charter for the respect, protection, and 
fulfilment of human freedom, while section 15 is the primary vehicle for the promotion 
of equality. Together, these lead provisions in the Charter correspond to the lead 
provision of the Universal Declaration and its ideal of achieving dignity through rights. 
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136 
Universal Declaration, 1948, Article 1 
21. With respect to s. 7, international human rights law plays two specific roles. First, in 
keeping with the principles set out in Slaight, international human rights law helps give 
minimal content to "life, liberty and security of the person" interests. Second, as Chief 
Justice Lamer stated in this Court's first decision respecting s. 7, international human 
rights law is a central source of the content for the principles of fundamental justice. Like 
the Charter, this body of law places reasonable limits on individual rights. CCPI submits 
that if an infringement of a right cannot be justified under international law limitations 
analysis, it cannot be regarded as in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
Godbout v Longueuil [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para 69, 74-91, per La Forest J.  
Francis v. Canada, supra, para. 10 
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 503, 512 
22. With respect to s. 15, much of international human rights treaty law elaborates the 
substantive content and governmental responsibilities in the guarantee of equality. The 
CRC plays such a role with respect to the substantive equality rights of children. 
Violation of the Children's Rights Under the CRC and Section 7 
23. The deportation of Ms. Baker raises fundamental issues of security for her children. If 
they remain in Canada without their mother, they will be deprived of her positive 
parenting and their development will be placed at risk. These children experience 
multiple barriers in society as a result of racism and the challenges faced by their mother 
as a single parent without citizenship. As such, the presence of a mother on whom they 
are dependent for emotional and psychological well-being and development is all the 
more crucial.  
Landy and Tam, "Yes, Parenting Does Make a Difference to the Development of 
Children in Canada" National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, StatsCan 1996 
at 103-104 
R. v. Parks (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 at 365-370 
R. v. Williams [1998] S.C.J. No. 49 at paras. 21, 22, 35,54 
24. On the other hand, if the children leave Canada with their mother, they will be exposed to 
risk factors associated with the life that they can expect in Jamaica including poverty, 
lack of opportunity, and lack of broader familial and community support. There is a 
strong possibility that Ms. Baker will relapse into mental illness and not have the 
medication she needs to help her control her symptoms. 
Letter from Dr. Evan Collins, August 5, 1993, Respondent's Record, Tab 2G at 45-46 
Children's Aid Society Letter, August 18, 1993, Respondent's Record, Tab 2G at 43-44 
25. Security of the person, as guaranteed under s. 7 and interpreted expansively and 
purposively, includes the right to protection of and assistance to family relationships 
which promote the well-being and development of family members. Psychological 
evidence points to the fundamental value of protecting such relationships: 
1. Historically throughout the world, families have given children an 
essential sense of identity.... Disrupting these relationships can 
substantially harm the child. 1/4. [T]he principle of family continuity 
1/4recognizes children's need for continuous, caring family and 
community relationships that form a basis for connectedness throughout 
life. 
Patterson and Andrews, "Protecting the Child against Separation from the Family 
Environment" (1996) 15 Children's Legal Rights Jl 2 at 2 
B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at 431 (per 
Iacobucci J.) 
Beldjoudi v. France, Euro. Ct. H.R., Ser. A. No. 246, 26 March 1992 at 38 (per Judge 
Martens) 
26. An interpretation narrower than this would be entirely inconsistent with Canada's 
obligations under international human rights law, which provides extensive protection to 
family relationships. 
CRC, 1989, inter alia, Arts. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 16 
ICCPR, 1966 inter alia, Arts. 2(2), 17, 23 and 26 
ICESCR, 1966 inter alia, Arts. 2, 10, 11(1) 
CEDAW, inter alia, Arts. 11(2)(c), 16(f) 
27. More specifically, in the case of involuntary separation of children from their parents, 
three provisions of the CRC are particularly salient. 
 . Article 3, the over-arching "best interests of the child" provision, provides a 
minimal floor of protection in respect of all actions concerning children. 
Alston, "The Best Interests Principle: Toward a Reconciliation of Culture and 
Human Rights", (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and Family 1 at 13-16 
Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Hodgkin 
and Newell, prepared for UNICEF, 1998 at 37-40 
a. Article 9(1) provides that states "shall ensure" children and parents are not 
separated against their will except when necessary in the best interests of the 
child. 
b. Article 10(1) obliges states to expedite reunification of families, "in accordance 
with" their obligations under article 9(1), in a "positive" and "humane" manner.  
28. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted articles 9 and 10 as together 
recognizing a right of children not to have their parents deported. In 1995, the Committee 
expressed its regret that "refugee or immigrant children born in Canada may be separated 
from their parents facing a deportation order." The Committee also urged that 
"[s]olutions should also be sought to avoid expulsions causing the separation of families, 
in the spirit of article 9 of the Convention". 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.37 (9th Session, 1995), paras. 13 and 24 
Handbook, supra at 122-123  
29. It is clear from the Committee's formulation that the CRC obligation that a state refrain 
from deporting a parent is not absolute. But it is equally clear, contrary to the reasoning 
of Strayer J.A., that the state's obligation is not limited to the minor duty to tell a child of 
a parent's whereabouts after a deportation takes place. The state must first justify the 
deportation in light of the child's rights. 
30. In deciding to deport a parent in a context such as this, a state is required by the CRC to 
make the child's best interests the paramount consideration. This is because: 
 . article 10(1), as interpreted by the Committee, requires states to take "every 
feasible measure" to reunite parents with children across borders; and 
a. the duty under article 10(1) is expressly linked to article 9(1), which requires 
states to ensure a child is not separated from his or her parents unless such 
separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. 
31. If article 9(1)'s necessity test were fully applicable to deportation, the child's best interests 
would be the sole consideration for separation. However, the Committee's phrasing of the 
state's duty to avoid deportation is such that some room must be left for the state to 
invoke the public interest despite the fact that deportation would not accord with the 
citizen child's best interests. However, to justify deportation of a parent, a state's interests 
in deporting the parent must be far more compelling than the rights of the child and 
parent not to be separated. The appropriate test, in CCPI's submission, is similar to the 
third part of the Oakes proportionality test, with the child's interests being considered 
extremely weighty. 
R. v. Oakes, supra at 139 
32. In any event, article 3(1) of the CRC formulates the minimal test for determining when a 
parent of a child citizen can be deported. Even if the article 9(1) necessity test or a 
paramountcy test were not to apply, deportation could only be justified under article 3(1) 
if it could be shown the children's best interests were "a primary consideration" in the 
decision. Contrary to Strayer J.A.'s conclusion, article 3(1) applies to a wide range of 
circumstances and not simply to the family law context. As Officer Lorenz' notes clearly 
indicate, the children's interests were given only fleeting consideration. 
Detrick, ed., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the 
"Travaux Preparatoires", Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992 at 137, para. 121-122 
Alston, "The Best Interests Principle" supra at 13-14 
Handbook, supra, pp. 39-40 
Violation of Ms. Baker's Rights Under Article 17 of the ICCPR and Section 7 
33. The Human Rights Committee has adopted a balancing test with respect to separations of 
families by deportation under the right to family life in article 17 of the ICCPR. The 
Committee assesses whether "in the circumstances of [the] case the separation of [a 
person] from his [or her] family] and its effects on him [or her] were disproportionate to 
the objectives of the removal." Although the respondent relies on Canepa in support of its 
position, the factors which the Committee found significantly absent in Mr. Canepa's case 
are conspicuously present in the instant case. The Committee found that Canepa had 
"neither a spouse nor children in Canada"; he had "not shown that the support and 
encouragement of his family is likely to be helpful to him in the future" (regarding 
overcoming drug-addiction and associated criminality); he had not shown "that his 
separation from his family is likely to lead to a deterioration in his situation"; and "[t]here 
is no financial dependence involved in his family ties.  
Canepa v. Canada, Communication No. 558/1993, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (20 June 1997) at paras. 11.4 and 11.5 
34. The age of the children, Ms. Baker's contributions to Canadian society over 18 years, the 
family's connection to community here, the lack of any threat presented to the public by 
her presence, and her enhanced need for familial and community support given her 
mental illness all point to the disproportionality, indeed the inhumanity, of deporting Ms. 
Baker. 
35. The CRC provides a much more demanding justification test for deportation where 
children are involved than the general balancing test stated by the Human Rights 
Committee. The children enjoy the higher protection provided under the CRC. Article 
5(2) of the ICCPR stipulates that states may not invoke the ICCPR as a basis for 
recognising rights to a lesser extent than exist under another treaty. 
ICCPR, supra, Article 5(2) 
Violation of Ms. Baker's Rights under Section 15 
36. In Andrews , Mr. Justice La Forest observed that "non-citizens are an example without 
parallel of a group of persons who are relatively powerless politically, and whose 
interests are likely to be compromised by legislative decisions." Mr. Andrews was a 
permanent resident who enjoyed a generally privileged position in society as a white, 
male, lawyer. By contrast, Ms. Baker is a black, low-income, single mother without legal 
status in this country. Mr. Justice La Forest went on to observe in Andrews that 
"[d]iscrimination on the basis of nationality has from early times been an inseparable 
companion of discrimination on the basis of race and national or ethnic origin." His 
statement recognizes implicitly that multiple grounds of discrimination can interact to 
produce a compendious analogous ground. Mr. Justice La Forest's comments apply a 
fortiori to the appellant in this case and provide a basis for close Charter scrutiny of the 
exercise of discretion for conformity with section 15. 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 195 (per La Forest 
J.) 
Iyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 
Queen's L. J. 179 
Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks (1993), 101 D.L.R. 
(4th) 224 at 232-235. 
37. In his notes, Officer Lorenz relied upon Ms. Baker's status as a recipient of social 
assistance as a negative, discriminatory factor, contrary to s. 15 of the Charter, to s. 36(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, and to the recognition in virtually every human rights 
treaty that "property" and "social origin" are prohibited grounds of discrimination. He 
combined this with a number of intersecting stereotypes:  
 . Single mothers and social assistance He drew on a popular misconception that 
single mothers relying on social assistance are likely to be dependent on the 
government forever. He did not lend any credence to the fact that Ms. Baker had 
worked to support her family until she became ill after the birth of her last child. 
Falkiner v. Ontario (Comm. & Soc. Services) (1997), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 115 at 138 
Transitions, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, 1988, p. 44 
a. Mental illness and social assistance He assumed that all individuals with mental 
illness share common symptoms and prognoses. He failed to consider that the 
prognosis for control or recovery from mental illness is very individual, and he 
ignored the opinion of Ms. Baker's doctor that she could remain well and 
contribute to society, provided she had proper medication and support. 
Letter from Dr. Evan Collins, August 5, 1993, Respondent's Record, Tab 2G at 
45-46 
Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, "Schizophrenia, Fact Sheet" prepared by Social and 
Community Psychiatry Section (September 1990)  
Battlefords and District Co-op v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566 at 585-587  
b. Immigrants and social assistance In stating that "Canada can no longer afford this 
kind of generosity," the immigration officer operated under the stereotypical 
belief that immigrants are overly reliant on social assistance and are a drain on 
Canada's economy.  
Martha Kumsa, "Does Immigration Benefit Canada? Fact and Fiction" (OCASI, 
1996) 
Economic Council of Canada, New Faces in the Crowd, 1991, pp. 21-22  
Hon. Lucienne Robillard, Hansard, Vol. 134:092, 35th Parl. 2nd Sess., Oct. 29, 
1996, pp. 5769-5771 
c. Violence, race and mental illness The immigration officer's conclusion that "there 
is a potential for violence" must be understood in the context of a pervasive but 
erroneous popular belief that blacks and schizophrenics are prone to violence. The 
materials before the immigration officer indicated that Ms. Baker had been 
charged with assault but that the charges had been quashed. Despite this, he chose 
to raise the issue of violence. 
Immigration File, Respondent's Record, at 28, 54-55 
Devlin, "We Can't Go On Together With Suspicious Minds"(1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 408 at 
443 
Monahan & Arnold, "Violence By People With Mental Illness" (1996) 19 Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Journal at 67 
38. Officer Lorenz' assessment of Ms. Baker's application also betrays a systematic pattern of 
sex discrimination. First, he failed to consider the value of unremunerated domestic work 
and child care, the majority of which is performed by women. Second, the officer did not 
consider that the appellant's specific form of mental illness -- post-partum psychosis, a 
form of psychosis peculiar to women -- meant that she had a good chance of recovery 
provided that she had the proper medication and support, even though this information 
was put before the officer. 
Gunderson and Muszynski, Women and Labour Market Poverty, Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, 1990 at 12. 
Letter from Dr. Evan Collins, August 5, 1993, Respondent's Record, Tab 2G at 45-46 
39. This Court has held that s. 15 requires governments to act so as to ameliorate 
disadvantage and protect the vulnerable. CCPI submits that, in accordance with this 
Court's decision in Eldridge, where a statute permits the state to protect a person who is 
in need of protection and the state instead treats the person's needs as either irrelevant or 
as negative factors, then the state has failed to respect equality rights. In the case at bar, 
the state has provided specifically under s. 114(2) for the possibility of "humanitarian and 
compassionate considerations" being treated as the basis for allowing a person to stay in 
Canada. Officer Lorenz, however, did not consider the distinctive need for strong family 
and community supports arising from Ms. Baker's mental illness and her poverty. Rather, 
he turned the underlying values of the Charter and of international human rights law on 
their heads, turning valid humanitarian and compassionate considerations into 
discriminatory reasons for denying the appellant the benefit of the discretion permitted 
under the statute. 
Eldridge, supra 
Porter, "Beyond Andrews: Substantive Equality and Positive Obligations After Eldridge 
and Vriend" (1998) 9:3 Constitutional Forum 71 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 5, Persons 
with disabilities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/13 (1994) at paras. 9, 15, 19 
Violation of the Children's Rights under the CRC and Section 15 
40. Two animating equality principles in the CRC have already been recognised by this 
Court, thereby providing a firm basis for forging deeper normative links between the 
CRC and s.15: 
 . in Benner, this Court accepted that treatment of parents can too easily, 
intentionally or not, be "visited" upon children due to the fact that "the link 
between child and parent is of a particularly unique and intimate nature:" and 
a. in Eaton, this Court accepted the best interest principle as the measure of equality 
where children's rights are at issue. 
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State) [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 at 400  
Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 240 at 278-279 
Toope, "The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada" in 
Freeman, ed., Children's Rights: A Comparative Perspective, Dartmouth Publ., 1996 esp. 
at 34-37, 42, 46, 51-53  
41. With respect to harming children through treatment of parents, Article 2(1) of the CRC 
prohibits discrimination against children in relation to the subject-matter of CRC and 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a "parent's 1/4. status," including such 
intersecting features of a parent's identity and attribution as race, colour, sex, national 
origin, and disability. The Committee, in interpreting article 2(1), has expressed the view 
that it must be "vigourously applied" in general, and even more "actively" in the case of 
children who experience disadvantage. Article 2(2) of the CRC enhances the imperative 
nature of the obligations by specifically requiring states "to take all appropriate measures 
to ensure" the "protect[ion]" of a child from discrimination on the basis of "the 
status1/4of the child's parents." The ICESCR provides in article 10(3) that "[s]pecial 
measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children 1/4 
without any discrimination for reasons of parentage." 
UNICEF Handbook, supra at pp 22, 33 
ICESCR, supra, Article 10(3) 
42. Article 2(1) is non-exhaustive, ending with the words "or other status." Thus, Ms. Baker's 
children are discriminated against if their CRC rights are detrimentally affected due to 
Ms. Baker's status as a social assistance recipient having been counted heavily against 
allowing her to remain. Prohibition of discrimination on the ground of economic 
disadvantage can be viewed as being located in the interaction of the enumerated grounds 
of "social origin" and "property" and the open-ended "other status." Similarly, the travaux 
and commentary show that a child's rights in relation to, inter alia, care from parents 
(Article 7), national and family identity (Article 8), and non-separation from parents 
(Articles 9 and 10) are compromised by deportation of a parent due to the parent's 
immigration status, an analogous ground which is closely connected to the enumerated 
ground of parental nationality. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations, Canada, 
1993, supra at para. 18 
Detrick, supra at 142, para.  
Handbook, supra, pp. 26-27, 32-33 
43. Ms. Baker has clearly been discriminated against. However, the CRC does not require 
that treatment of the parent must amount to discrimination for it to be discriminatory to 
fail to protect a child from harm resulting from treatment of a parent. CCPI submits that 
the reasoning of Iacobucci J. in Benner, taken as a whole, does not require that the 
treatment of the parent itself has to be discrimination. However, if this Court interprets 
Benner differently, CCPI submits that this Court should consider revisiting this issue in 
light of the clear provisions in Article 2 of the CRC. 
Benner, supra. at 397-403 
44. With respect to the best interests principle, a fundamental disadvantage of children with 
respect to the benefit of law is that, without special measures, their interests are unlikely 
to be represented or considered in proceedings which may have a significant effect on 
their well-being. Officer Lorenz' failure to consider the children's best interest at least as 
a primary consideration as required by Article 3(1) of the CRC amounts to a violation of 
s. 15 because it represents a denial of their special need for protection from harm. The 
respondent's argument that the deportation of a mother is not a matter "concerning" Ms. 
Baker's children serves to entrench their vulnerability and reinforce their inequality, 
rendering them invisible and irrelevant in a process which affects them profoundly. 
B. THE TREATY ROUTE 
45. This Court and the courts in other jurisdictions have adopted a rule of statutory 
interpretation that statutes be interpreted, to the fullest extent possible, to comply with 
international treaty obligations. This principle, founded in the rule of law, is based on the 
presumption that the legislature intends to act in compliance with international law. 
Jacobs and Roberts, eds., The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1987 at 32-33 (Italy), 60 (France), 69 (Germany), 100 (Italy), 135, 137 (U.K.), 
160 (U.S.) 
Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed., Toronto and Vancouver, 
Butterworths, 1994 at 330-333 
46. This presumption of compliance with international law applies to all international law, 
not just treaty law, and to all treaties, regardless of the extent to which they have been 
"incorporated" through domestic legislation. This Court's direction, in National Corn 
Growers, to "strive" to interpret statutes to conform to "relevant international obligations" 
must be understood as a statement of general applicability. It is relevance of a treaty to a 
statute's subject-matter that matters, not the either/or dichotomy of whether or not a treaty 
is incorporated.  
Bayefsky, "International Human Rights Law in Canadian Courts" in Conforti and 
Francioni, eds., Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts, Kluwer, 1997 
at 312-313 
Re. Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 50 at 89-90 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 751 
National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1371 
47. The generality of the presumption is further suggested by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs' practice of not viewing specific legislative incorporation as necessary for 
Canada's treaty obligations to be implemented in domestic law. The presumption thus 
matches up with the requirement under international treaty law that domestic law must be 
changed only where existing law is inadequate to meet the relevant international 
obligations. Where a treaty requires that it be given legal effect in the domestic order and 
the state ratifies the treaty but does not modify any law, it should be presumed that a 
state, interpreting its treaty obligations in good faith, views its law as already conforming 
to the obligations. 
Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law, Toronto and Vancouver, Butterworths, at 
62-63 
Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., Longman, 1996, at 82-
86 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969, Art. 31(1)  
48. The scope of administrative power granted under s.114(2) of the Act is a matter of 
statutory interpretation. The interpretive presumption of compliance with international 
law is thus a doctrine of judicial review in administrative law in the same way as the 
Slaight double presumption. 
49. The issue of judicial review of decisions to deport parents of citizen children has been 
raised in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, notably in the Teoh case in Australia and the 
Tavita case in New Zealand. In each case, the courts were clearly seeking a standard 
administrative law basis to urge the authorities to reconsider their decisions -- Teoh 
through the doctrine of legitimate expectations and Tavita through the doctrine of 
relevant considerations. Tavita comes close to articulating the interpretive obligation 
being advocated by CCPI but falls short of requiring the avoidance of a breach of 
international human rights as a mandatory consideration. 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995), 128 ALR 353 (Austal. H.Ct.) 
Tavita v. Minister of Immigration [1993] 2 NZLR 257 (N.Z.C.A.) 
50. Murray Hunt has also argued -- very persuasively -- for a judicial obligation to interpret 
statutes in conformity, where at all possible, with international human rights obligations. 
This approach avoids the pitfalls of the use of doctrines (especially that of legitimate 
expectations) that fall short of the deeper impulse motivating judges to invoke them. It is 
also a more principled approach in that it deals directly with human rights as legal values 
which are justifiably the subject of generous statutory interpretation and puts the onus on 
legislatures to express their intention to curtail or fail to protect a right. 
Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, Hart Publishing, (Oxford: 1997), 207-
261, esp. at 230-258, & 297-324 
51. The Minister in this case makes much of the distinction between incorporated and 
unincorporated treaties as a basis for contending that the appellant seeks to give the CRC 
direct effect in domestic law. However, the Minister fails to understand that reliance on 
the CRC is based on a presumption of statutory interpretation and not on invoking the 
CRC as a direct source of rights. Interpreting provisions in a statute (including the terms 
by which an executive power is granted as in s. 114(2)) is just that, statutory 
interpretation. If a statute is capable of being interpreted to conform with Canada's 
international obligations, then such an interpretation must be adopted. What occurs is an 
interpretive reception of international treaty law rather than direct application of the 
treaty. 
52. The presumption of conformity of statutes with international law is a "rule of law" 
doctrine tied to the institutional role of the courts in promoting fundamental legality. This 
is why, with respect, there is no basis for Mr. Justice Strayer's concern that the executive, 
by ratifying the CRC, is fettering the discretion granted by Parliament. Mr. Justice 
Strayer's reasoning, if followed, would undermine the very purpose of judicial review in a 
society based on the rule of law. It also ignores the hardship that can be caused as a result 
of unaccountable executive decision-making in the immigration context. 
McLachlin, "Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada" (1992) 56 Sask. Law 
Rev. 166 esp. at 178-179 
Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective 
of Legal Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 at 138-140, 155-158 
Foster, Turnstile Immigration: Multiculturalism, Social Order & Social Justice in 
Canada, Thomson Educ. Publ., Toronto, 1998 at 38-39, 54-57, 67-69, 119-123 
53. Parliament can legislate contrary to international law. However, Parliament must enact 
provisions that clearly and unavoidably conflict with international law to rebut the 
presumption of compliance with international law. Where it does so, international law 
will have no direct effect on the statute. Where it has not done so, courts must strive to 
interpret domestic statutes and the constraints on discretionary decision-making in 
compliance with international law. 
54. With respect to federalism, Strayer J.A is correct that a court may not interpret a statute 
so broadly that it violates the federal division of powers. But this has no relevance to this 
case. No interpretation at issue in this case takes the federal government outside its 
jurisdiction over immigration. 
55. There are furthermore no division of powers problems with respect to the effect of 
international treaties on provincial executive discretion or, put differently, interpretation 
of provincial statutes. The presumption of compliance with international law is a rule of 
law doctrine. The constitution allows the federal executive to bind Canada in 
international treaty-making. That international law as constitutionally created may 
lawfully structure discretion of provincial administrative actors is highlighted by the law 
of treaties which prohibits states from raising their internal legal order as a basis for 
failure to comply with a treaty obligation. In any event, in the international human rights 
field, there is a standing process of federal-provincial cooperation in which provincial 
consent to ratification of an international human rights treaty is normally sought and 
received. In any event, provincial legislatures have as full a power as the federal 
Parliament to legislate to express their intent to breach rights. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art 27 
Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law, supra. at 50-53 
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHARTER AND TREATY ROUTES 
56. While a decision-maker is expected to avoid breaches both of the Charter and of relevant 
international human rights treaties, a plaintiff seeking judicial review should have the 
option of invoking the treaty as a basis for interpreting statutory powers even if there is 
every likelihood that the right at issue is also protected via the Charter. Allowing 
plaintiffs to invoke the presumption of compliance with an international human rights 
treaty, unmediated by the Charter, could have the salutary effect of gradually introducing 
judges to the structure and jurisprudence of international human rights law. 
D. INTERPRETING S.114(2) 
The Charter Route in Relation to s.114(2) 
57. According to the Slaight interpretive approach, judicial review of administrative conduct 
is a matter of statutory interpretation by the reviewing court according to a correctness 
standard. Once it is determined that the statute is capable of being given at least a content 
that would avoid violating the constitution, other interpretive issues relating to the scope 
of the administrative discretion within the same statutory provision may well be subject 
to a different standard of review. 
Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 at 850-852 
58. There are two major interpretive questions related to s.114(2): 
 . the meaning of "existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations"; and  
a. the extent of the power of the Minister not to facilitate admission even if the 
reviewing courts takes the view that considerations exist that should require 
admission. 
59. With respect to the first question, CCPI submits that the words in question are very open-
textured. They thus lend themselves to interpretation consistent with human rights 
protection. Further, the word "humanitarian" is a particularly apt expression to 
accommodate the duty under the Charter and international human rights to take positive 
measures to ameliorate disadvantage. Section 114(2) sends no signal that Parliament 
intended to permit violation of rights ratified in international treaties in the exercise of the 
power to decide whether to exempt a person from deportation. 
60. With respect to the second question, it might appear that Parliament has authorised 
violations of human rights by legislating a subjective standard for the Minister's decision. 
However, it is not in the least unknown in administrative law, and statutory interpretation 
more generally, for words connoting "may" to be read by the courts to mean "must." 
CCPI submits that such a reading is required where fundamental considerations of the 
rule of law and human rights are at stake.  
Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2d. ed., Cowansville (Quebec), Yvon 
Blais, 1991 at 201-202 
61. The Slaight interpretive presumption of compliance with the Charter is as a directive to 
avoid conflict between a statute and the Charter. An analogy to federalism paramountcy 
doctrine is suggested: can the administrative decision-maker comply both with the 
Charter and with the statute? The Minister does not breach s.114(2) by giving effect to 
human rights within her powers. Nothing in s.114(2) prohibits the Minister from 
conforming to the Charter. Thus, s.114(2) can be read to include, as a minimum content, 
adherence to Charter rights (and thus, in this case, the CRC and the ICCPR) without 
placing the Minister in the position of violating the statute.  
The Treaty Route in Relation to s.114(2) 
62. All of the above substantive analysis of the human rights treaties undertaken as part of 
determining the scope of the Charter can, in accordance with the presumption of 
conformity with international law, be brought to bear in the same manner on the 
interpretation of s.114(2), unmediated through the Charter, as long as the standard of 
review is also the standard of correctness. 
63. In Pushpanathan, this Court held that the standard of review with respect to the 
international legal meaning of a provision of the Refugee Convention in domestic law 
was the correctness standard. In the case at bar, the meaning of the relevant provisions in 
international human rights treaties as well as the interpretation of whether s.114(2) is 
open-textured enough to allow compliance with these treaties should also be subject to 
correctness review. In particular, the underlying rationale in Pushpanathan that human 
rights are presumptively the preserve of the courts is very salient. The special role of 
domestic courts in relation to international human rights law adds to the need for a 
correctness standard. 
Pushpanathan v. Canada (MCI) [1998] S.C.J. No. 46 at paras. 23-50, esp. at 45-47 
Conclusion 
64. The granting of a power of decision in the terms of s.114(2) ("is satisfied") is simply one 
facet of the broader question of how to interpret legislative silence in terms of the 
legislature's intention as to what conduct an administrative actor may engage in. Silence 
or relative silence -- along a continuum of discretion -- does not authorize statutory 
decision-makers to break the law, much less fundamental human rights law, whether 
constitutional or international. It is not for the courts to do the work for the legislature 
and assume that omissions mean that the legislature intended to permit rights violations. 
Hunt, supra, pp 137-138 
PART IV - ORDER SOUGHT 
65. CCPI respectfully requests that the appeal be allowed. 
Date: September 4, 1998  
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED  
 
John Terry 
 
Craig Scott 
Of counsel for the Intervener, 
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues 
PART V - AUTHORITIES 
  CASE LAW Page 
No. 
  Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 143 at 195 (per La Forest J.) 
10 
  B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, 
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at 431 (per Iacobucci J.) 
7 
  Battlefords and District Co-Op v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 
566 at 585-587 
11 
  Beldjoudi v. France, European Court of Human Rights, 
Series A. No. 246, 26 March 1992 at 38 (per Judge 
Martens) 
8 
  Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State) [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 
at 397-403 [Respondent's Authorities] 
13, 14 
  Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 
751 
15 
  Canepa v. Canada, Communication No. 558/1993, Human 
Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (20 
June 1997) at paras. 11.4 and 11.5 [Respondent's 
Authorities] 
10 
  Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. 
Sparks, (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 at 232-235 
11 
  Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
240 at 278-279 
13 
  Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 624 
3, 12 
  Falkiner v. Ontario (Comm. & Soc. Services) (1997), 140 
D.L.R. (4th) 115 at 138 
11 
  Francis v. Canada [1998] O.J. No. 1791 5, 6 
  Godbout v Longueuil [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para 69, 74-91, per 
La Forest J.  
6 
  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh 
(1995),128 ALR 353 (Austral. H.Crt.) [Respondent's 
Authorities] 
15 
  National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1371 
15 
  Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) [1998] S.C.J. No. 46 at paras. 23-50, esp. 45-
47 [Respondent's Authorities] 
19 
  R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 750 4 
  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136, 139 6, 9 
  R. v. Parks (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 at 365-370 7 
  R. v. Williams [1998] S.C.J. No. 49 at paras 21, 22, 35, 54 
[Respondent's Authorities] 
7 
  Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 503, 
512 
6 
  Re: Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 50 at 89-90 15 
  Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15 [1996] 1 
SCR 825 at 850-852 
18 
  Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1038 at 1056-1057, 1078-1081 per Dickson C.J. 
3 
  Suresh v. R. (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 267 5 
  Tavita v. Minister of Immigration (1993), [1993] 2 NZLR 
257 (N.Z.C.A.) [Appellant's Authorities] 
15 
  CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES   
  Convention on the Rights of the Child [1990] Can. T.S. 
No.3, inter alia, Arts. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 16 
[Respondent's Authorities] 
8 
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inter 
alia, Arts. 2(2), 17, 23 and 26 Article 5(2) [Respondent's 
Authorities] 
8, 10 
  ICESCR, 1966, Arts. 2, 10, 11(1) Article 10(3) 
[Appellant's Authorities] 
8, 13 
  CEDAW, 1979, Arts, 4, 5, 11(2)(c), 12, 13, 15, 16(f) 8 
  Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1948 Article 1 6 
  Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 Art 27, Art. 
31(1) 
17 
  ARTICLES AND MONOGRAPHS   
  Alston, Philip "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges 
Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 HRQ 332 at 357 
5 
  Alston, Philip "The Best Interests Principle: Toward a 
Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights", (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and Family 1 at 13, 14 
8, 9 
  Bayefsky, Anne F. "International Human Rights Law in 
Canadian Courts" in Conforti and Francioni, eds., Enforcing 
International Human Rights in Domestic Courts, Dordrecht, 
Kluwer, (1997) at 50-53, 312-319 
15, 17 
  Bayefsky, Anne F. International Human Rights Law: Use in 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Litigation, 
Toronto and Vancouver, Butterworths, (1992) at 62-63 
15 
  Canadian Mental Health Association "Schizophrenia: Fact 
Sheet" 
11 
  Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, "Schizophrenia, Fact Sheet" 
prepared by Social and Community Psychiatry Section 
(September 1990)  
11 
  Côté, Pierre-André The Interpretation of Legislation in 
Canada, 2d. ed., Cowansville (Quebec), Yvon Blais, (1991) 
at 201-202 
18 
  Detrick, Sharon ed., The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: A Guide to the "Travaux 
Preparatoires", Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, (1992) at 137 
para. 121-122, 142 
9, 14 
  Devlin, Richard F. "We Can't Go On Together With 
Suspicious Minds" (1995) 18 Dal. Law Journal 137 at 408 
at 432 
12 
  Dyzenhaus, David Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: 
South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy, 
Clarendon Press, (Oxford: 1991) at 138-140, 155-158 
16 
  Foster, Lorne Turnstile Immigration: Multiculturalism, 
Social Order & Social Justice in Canada, Thomson Educ. 
Publ., Toronto, 1998 at 38-39, 54-57, 67-69, 119-123 
16 
  Gunderson, Morley; Muzynski, Leon and Keck, Jennifer, 
Women and Labour Market Poverty (Ottawa: Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1990) at 13 
12 
  Higgins, Rosalyn Problems and Process: International Law 
and How we Use It, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994 at 206-
207 
3 
  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24(52), 
General comment on issues relating to reservations..., U.N. 
Doc. CPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) 
5 
  Hunt, Murray Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, 
Hart Publishing, (Oxford: 1997) at 25-28, 137-138, 207-
261, 297-324 
16, 19 
  Iyer, Nitya "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and 
Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L. J. 179 
11 
  Jacobs, Francis G. and Roberts, Shelley, eds., The Effect of 
Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, (London: 
1987) at 32-33 (Italy), 60 (France), 69 (Germany), 100 
(Italy), 135, 137 (U.K.), 160 (U.S.) 
14 
  Jennings, Sir Robert and Watts, Sir Arthur, eds., 
Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., London and New 
York, Longman, 1996, at 82-86 
15 
  Kumsa, Martha "Does Immigration Benefit Canada? Fact 
and Fiction" (OCASI, 1996) 
11 
  Economic Council of Canada, New Faces in the Crowd, 
1991, pp. 21-22  
12 
  Landy, Sarah and Tam, Kwok Kwan, "Yes, Parenting Does 
Make a Difference to the Development of Children in 
Canada" National Longitudinal Survey of Children and 
Youth, StatsCan 1996 at 103-104 
7 
  Monahan & Arnold, "Violence by People with Mental 
Illness" (1996) 19 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal at 67 
12 
  Patterson, Elizabeth G. and Andrews Arlene Bowers , 
"Protecting the Child against Separation from the Family 
Environment" (1996) 15 Children's Legal Rights Jl 2 at 2 
7 
  Porter, Bruce "Beyond Andrews: Substantive Equality and 
Positive Obligations After Eldridge and Vriend" (1998) 9:3 
Constitutional Forum 71  
12 
  Randall, Kenneth C. Federal Courts and the International 
Human Rights Paradigm, Durham, Duke U.P., 1990 at 206, 
280 
4 
  Sullivan, Ruth Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd 
ed., (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1994) at 330-
333 
14 
  The Honourable Mr. Justice Gerard La Forest, "The 
Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
International Law Issues" (1996) 34 CYIL 89 at 91, 98, 
100-101 
4, 5 
  The Honourable Madame Justice McLachlin, "Rules and 
Discretion in the Governance of Canada" (1992) 56 Sask. 
Law Rev. 166 esp. at 178-179 
16 
  Toope, S. "The convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Implications for Canada" in Freeman, ed., Children's Rihts: 
A Comparative Perspective, Dartmouth Publ., 1996 esp. at 
34-37, 42, 46, 51-53 
13 
  Transitions, Report of the Social Assistance Review 
Committee, 1988, p. 44 
11 
  Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, Hodgkin and Newell, prepared for UNICEF, 
1998 
8, 9, 
13, 14 
  OTHER   
  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations on Canada, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1993/5 (1993) at 18 
5, 13 
  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 5, Persons with disabilities, U.N. 
Doc. E/C. 12/1994/13 (1994) at paras 9, 15, 19 
12 
  Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding 
Observations, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.37 (9th Session, 
1995), paras. 13 and 24 
8 
  CRC General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents 
of Periodic Reports, 1996 
5 
  Rt. Hon. Antonio Lamer, "Enforcing International Human 
Rights law: The Treaty System in the 21st Century", 
address at York University, June 22, 1997 at 3, 4, 6 and 7  
4, 6 
  The Honourable Lucienne Robillard, Hansard, Vol. 
134:092, 35th Parl. 2nd Sess., October 29, 1996 pp. 5769-
5771 
 
 
